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Abstract
From the inception of European integration, a regime trying to regulate and arrange competition as
much as considered necessary for the benefit of society at large has been one of the core elements of
the European Union’s legal order. While the European Union has over the past few decades become
more and more involved in the European space effort, this has so far hardly given rise to fundamental application of this competition regime to space activities, even if space also in Europe increasingly
has become commercialized and privatized. The current paper investigates the reasons and rationale
for this special situation, addressing inter alia the special character of outer space activities and the
space industry and the role of the European Space Agency in this respect.

1. Introduction
During the last few decades the European Union has become interested in outer space,
more particularly in the benefits which space activities could bring to the populations and
economies of its member states.1 Roughly in the same timeframe, the global commercialization and ensuing privatization of space activities started to take off in earnest, with the
privatization of the major international satellite operators,2 the take-off of an international
commercial market for space launch services,3 and the involvement of a few private operators in the satellite remote sensing sector.4 Noting that the heart of the European Union’s
legal order concerns the creation of an Internal Market with common external borders constituting a level playing field for private companies—read: the establishment of fair and
free competition—it may come as a surprise to many that the Union’s involvement with
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space has not given rise to full-fledged application of its competition regime in the context
of those space sectors. The current paper investigates the reasons and rationale for this
special situation. Following a brief reminder of the special nature of the European Union,
it will then focus on the special character of space activities and the space industry, before
addressing the more detailed peculiarities of the European “spacescape” which gave rise
to the current situation. Such peculiarities concern the nature of EU law, the special role of
the European Space Agency (ESA) as a separate player in that “spacescape,” and the approach to the regulation of competition in European space activities resulting from these
two premises.
2. The special nature of the European Union
In the context of the political discourse over the last decades the impression often arises
that the European Union has become a “super state,” a kind of “United States of Europe”
which has “demoted” its member states to a status of semiautonomous provinces within
some kind of large empire. This might perhaps be understandable, given the active role of
the European Commission as the leading and most visible EU organ supervising the implementation of the EU “project,” the existence of a proper European Parliament discussing legislation which is applicable EU-wide, and the judgements of a Court of Justice which
can enforce such legislation against the will of individual member states and/or overriding
any particular national legislation on the issue.5
However, as the impending “Brexit” makes all too clear, the Union at the heart is still
an intergovernmental construct of sovereign states which also retain the ultimate sovereign right to step out of that construct. In the last resort, the Union goes back to the three
founding treaties of the 1950s (including the most important one establishing the European
Economic Community),6 with the 1992 Treaty on European Union7 finalizing the process
of merging the three resulting communities in the framework of an all-encompassing European Union. Many more treaties between the member states both before and after the
Treaty on European Union added to the ever-increasing integration of the member states,
but the essence remained that all of the member states at the time of conclusion of such a
particular treaty had to ratify it before the additional measure of further integration would
become a matter of law.8
Not only “Brexit” and the famous Article 50 of the current version of the Treaty on European Union on the basis of which “Brexit” would take place9 but also the general construct of the Union’s legal framework is clear about this: whatever EU law results from the
EU administrative machinery, it is ultimately based on competences of EU organs and processes involving those organs agreed to by the member states by way of the treaties.
The legal and legislative competences of the European Commission are thus limited to
those spelled out by Article 17 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 244–250 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,10 to
which all member states have consented as per their ratification of the relevant treaties.
Likewise, the competences of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice are confined to those provided by the treaties.11 The competence of the Council of Ministers finally, representing the individual member states directly, ensures that no EU legislation
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can get enacted without at least the consent of a majority, usually a qualified majority and
occasionally even unanimity, of those member states.12 Even where there is, due to margins
of interpretation or unclarity of certain provisions, room for discussion as to whether the
EU organs have actually been given the competence to enact EU law (in particular of course
if against the wishes of one or more specific member states), the default approach is unequivocal. As expressed most fundamentally through the three key principles of “conferral,” “subsidiarity,” and “proportionality,” as a baseline it should be assumed that relevant
issues, scenarios, and developments should be dealt with legally at the national level rather
than at the EU level.13 Only if specific parameters dictate otherwise, would EU-level jurisdiction come into play.
In short: whether it concerns space activities or anything else, the EU organs can only
exercise their competences to enact binding law over and above that of individual member
states to the extent that the treaties, further law enacted on the basis thereof, and the principles of “conferral,” “subsidiarity,” and “proportionality” allow for. This brings us to the
question what possibilities to exercise jurisdiction with respect to outer space activities individual states would have to begin with. After all, following the maxim nemo dat quod not
habet or its more extended continental version nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam
ipse habet14 individual states could never provide a joint construct such as the European
Union with more competences than such states would have themselves pursuant to international space law.
3. The special character of outer space and space activities
When it comes to states’ legal possibilities (including those of EU member states in view
of the foregoing) to exercise control over space activities, outer space amounts to what can
be termed a “global commons”: an area outside of national jurisdiction15 and, contrary to
the terra nullius which historically could be found on Earth, not susceptible to ever becoming part of national territory.16
Thus, not being able to exercise territorial jurisdiction over any part of outer space, states
are basically left with three options to exercise jurisdiction over outer space activities. This
notably of course concerns space activities by private enterprise, as states are internationally responsible and liable for those pursuant to Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space
Treaty.17
First, to the extent that such private space activities are remote-controlled, that is with
the key actor somewhere on earth, normally territorial jurisdiction can still be applied as it
were through the backdoor—namely to actors on national territory even if the activities themselves take place in outer space.18 The crucial difference is that such an exercise of jurisdiction
is not “exclusive” in that other states can equally authorize, prohibit, or condition activities
in the same area of outer space—as long as conducted from their respective territories.
Many states indeed have enunciated national space laws using territorial jurisdiction in
the above manner in order to exercise legal control over space activities conducted by private operators.19 This applies to all eight EU member states so far having established an
all-encompassing national space law:20 Sweden,21 Belgium,22 the Netherlands,23 France,24,
Austria,25 Denmark,26 Finland,27 and the United Kingdom.28
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Second, states can (continue to) exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the
actors, whether natural or legal persons. While there may be issues with enforcing such
jurisdiction if such nationals are physically outside of the country, in principle nationalitybased jurisdiction can be exercised vis-à-vis their activities regardless of where they would
be undertaken. This also applies in outer space, noting again that by definition this does
not amount to “exclusive” jurisdiction as no particular state could exercise any legal control over the nationals of other states active in the same area.
Once again, pursuant to the above many of the states with national space legislation
have chosen to apply it fundamentally to space activities conducted by their nationals,
usually in addition to application to those conducted from their territory. Among the EU
member states, Sweden,29 the United Kingdom,30 France,31 Austria,32 Denmark,33 and Finland34 comprehensively apply their nationality-based jurisdiction as per their respective
national space laws, whereas Belgium35 and the Netherlands36 allow for such application
under certain, specifically indicated circumstances.
Third, following the provisions of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention,37 states can exercise quasiterritorial jurisdiction over space objects registered by them (as well as over “any personnel thereof,”38 which, however, is relevant for
manned spaceflight only).
A number of states have more or less explicitly included such a reference to quasiterritorial jurisdiction over registered space objects in their national laws, including, as for EU
member states, Belgium39 and Denmark.40 The other six EU member states discussed here
(Sweden,41 the United Kingdom,42 the Netherlands,43 France,44 Austria,45 and Finland46)
have at least provided for national registration of relevant space objects. By that token, the
exercise of jurisdiction over these space objects (at least potentially) may be presumed, as
the registration processes as detailed in the legislation provide for considerable detail regarding the information to be provided, which would logically also impact the actual grant
or refusal of a license in the first place.
Obviously, once more such jurisdiction is not “exclusive” vis-à-vis the area of outer
space as such, since it does not at all impact the right of other states to prohibit, allow or
condition their space objects and personnel thereof to be active in outer space.
Clearly, then, following from the above analysis the collective EU member states could
transfer the competence to use jurisdiction applicable to space activities conducted from
the territories of EU member states, and/or conducted by EU nationals (including companies), and/or involving EU-registered space objects, to the EU institutional machinery—
should they desire to do so.
4. The European Union and space: the baseline legal situation
The first problem with EU jurisdiction over space activities in general, however, is that the
European Union itself is not a party to the space treaties. As far as the Outer Space Treaty
is concerned, the most fundamental and comprehensive of the space treaties, this is even
excluded by the very terms of the Treaty.47 Neither would it make much sense to the extent
that the Treaty addresses entities actually undertaking space activities, whereas the Union
has so far refrained from doing that itself.48
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As for the other space treaties, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the
Registration Convention do indeed allow the Union in principle to become a quasiparty to
those conventions as an intergovernmental organization.49
The European Union, however, has chosen not to opt for such a quasiparty status under
any of the treaties concerned—which notably also prevents it from becoming a quasistate
of registry under the Registration Convention so as to allow it to exercise jurisdiction in an
internationally recognized fashion over space objects to be registered by the Union.50
As such, this would still allow the Union, once properly authorized under the European
treaties, to exercise jurisdiction over activities conducted from member-state territory (that
is: territorial jurisdiction) or by member-state nationals (that is, nationality-based jurisdiction).
However, this is where the second problem arises, which goes to the heart of the EU
legal order as established over time by its member states.
On the one hand, when it comes to competition, free trade, and market issues, the European treaties clearly provide for an overarching role of the EU institutions. An Internal
Market has since long been established for the trade in goods51 and services52 (meaning
obstacles to trade between EU member states such as import and export duties and quota
have all been completely abolished), and with some caveats also for the free movement of
capital53 and persons for economic purposes.54 Taxation is increasingly harmonized as between member states,55 and also when it comes to external trade relations (between one or
more EU member states on the one hand and one or more non-EU member states on the
other) individual member states have handed over their erstwhile sovereign competences
to the EU institutions56—all within the parameters of EU lawmaking sketched earlier.
Most importantly, within that Internal Market, ensuring free and fair competition (as
long as the threats thereto are of sufficient size and international impact) is now the primary domain for the EU institutions, notably the European Commission, to address
through such mechanisms as the prohibitions on collusive conduct (“cartels”), abuse of
dominant position (“monopolies”) and state aid.57
On the other hand, however, this regime, going back all the way to the original EEC
Treaty of 1957, never was contemplated to be applied in the space sector—which in 1957
was almost nonexistent in Europe even as to the public sector, whereas a European private
space sector could be seen to arise at best as early as the 1980s with the first private European space operator SES.58 As a consequence, the European Union only started to pay attention to outer space in a very general sense in that same timeframe.59 It certainly did not
undertake any initiatives to start using its standard legal and regulatory competences in
this special realm, riddled with security-related issues from which the Union was supposed to steer clear for a long time.60
Only when in the late 1990s within Europe the understanding became widespread that
the potential benefits of space activities for humanity extended far beyond defense and
science, did the Union seek more legal competences in the space arena—again, within the
parameters of EU law-making sketched earlier.
The first—and so far main—result of that process was the enunciation in 1994 of the
Satellite Directive,61 which had initiated the application of the competition regime to satellite telecommunication services and the consequent development of an Internal Market

5

VON DER

DUNK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 61ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

also in that sector.62 It provided proof among others that for the EU institutions to be legitimately entitled to start legislating in an area hitherto essentially untouched by EU law, it
required a specific process giving rise to specific baseline legislation such as the Satellite
Directive—in this case explicitly justified by both its international and its increasingly commercial character.
For other space-related sectors, however, similar developments were not likely to happen anytime soon, as commercialization and privatization there turned out to be only partial, haphazard, idiosyncratic, and fraught with specific government concerns and interference. Still, the Union had come to understand that space technology and operations as
a whole, not just those in the communications realm, would be crucial for Europe’s position in the world also in the civil and commercial areas, and was looking to push ahead in
those other realms as well.
The current result of this understanding in terms of the law63 is Article 189(2) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This clause provides that, in order to
attain the objectives of promoting scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness, joint initiatives, and support for research and technological development, “the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European
space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”64
As a result, it may now be safely said that the Union institutions are—at least in principle—able to assert their jurisdiction in re competition in any field of space activity (not just
space communications). It was clear that the competition regime had already been harmonized as such for many decades, and none of the national space laws dealt with competition issues to any appreciable extent, so as to preclude harmonization thereof following
the last sentence of Article 189(2).
5. The European Union and competition in space: the exceptions
Why then has the European Union, in spite of its competences being generally applicable
now also beyond the satellite communications sector, so far refrained from applying its
competition regime to other areas of space activities in view of the undeniable commercialization and privatization thereof?
There are three main, interconnected reasons for this.
First, the last sentence of Article 189(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union—“excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”—
did throw a bit of a wrench into the system, as it clearly left the competence of individual
member states to license and supervise any private space activities untouched. Noting that
some of the national laws did provide for possibilities of public-private partnerships
broadly speaking (which from an orthodox EU-perspective would qualify as a form of state
aid, in principle prohibited by EU law) in the context of their licensing regimes,65 accurate,
transparent, and equal implementation of any EU competence in the realm of competition
would be considerably compromised, if not in the end impossible to achieve, jeopardizing
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already the very principle underlying the EU competition regime—an Internal Market on
equal terms across all of the EU member states.
Second, it should be noted that while the EU competition regime provides, as indicated,
for prohibitions of collusive conduct and abuse of dominant positions by companies as
well as state aid as the major threats from that angle to free and fair competition, it also
provides for exceptions to the illegitimacy of such activities.
As for collusive conduct for example, it may be condoned if the conduct “contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”66
And as to state aid, a tool also outlawed in principle by the EU competition regime since
a level playing field for free and fair competition would be an illusion if some States are
allowed to support their companies with all sorts of financial aid, it may nevertheless be
condoned if it concerns, for instance, “aid to promote the execution of an important project
of common European interest” or “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic
activities.”67
Such European flagship projects as Galileo and Copernicus could clearly qualify as “important project[s] of common interest” and even more easily as “certain economic activities.” Still, this has never been formally so stated by the EU institutions, which might as
such leave the question open as to any future reassessment of the situation.
However, as for Galileo, the earlier of the two flagship projects, it has so far been proven
impossible to convince the private sector to take any leading role in that respect; the intended privatization of system operation, service provision and system maintenance has
not materialized.68 As a consequence, the approach not only for Galileo but (so far at least)
also for Copernicus remains one driven by public institutions, making the potential application of competition rules a rather moot question.
More broadly, it can be said that apart from satellite communications, in Europe no
space activities as of yet could be operated as “normal” private commercial enterprises.
In the launch sector, there was only one European commercial launch service provider,
Arianespace, which moreover, though a private company in law, in fact enjoyed very substantial support of the European Space Agency and its member states in the R&D as well
as policy realms.69
In the satellite remote sensing sector, until the advent of TerraSAR-X there was also only
one private company fundamentally involved, SpotImage, which moreover more or less
until now depends also on fundamental support in terms of the space operations from, in
particular, the French space agency CNES.70
This is also where the third element in the mix comes in: the unique role of the European
Space Agency (ESA) in the European “spacescape,” which took care of almost all nonmilitary and nonnational space activities other than satellite communications and embodied
living proof that even in the space manufacturing industry a “normal” commercial market
environment was largely missing.
ESA had, ever since its establishment in 1975 by way of the ESA Convention,71 fundamentally incorporated the European manufacturing industry in undertaking the space activities it was mandated to undertake by its member states. The system used to engage
such private industries was premised on the concepts of “geographical distribution” and
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“fair return,” which in their essence amounted to assuring every ESA member state that
“ideally [it] should see 100 per cent of its committed financial contribution to an ESA programme returned to its industry in the form of contracts”72—and in reality should at least
end up as closely as possible to that ideal.
There can be no question that this system ensured the interests of ESA member states in
financially contributing to ESA programs as well as in ESA’s success in general, and thus
can be deemed crucial for the European role in outer space.73
However, from the perspective of EU competition law this system could also be judged
as either veiled collusion between the companies concerned, using their respective member states as proxies (“if you convince your government you are not interested in this particular contract, we will tell our government not to compete with you in respect of that
other contract”), or as indirect state aid (states using ESA as a conduit to make sure their
industries receive certain contracts without too much competition)—or even both; which
would obviously be in principled violation of such provisions as Articles 101 and 107 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as discussed above.74
The EU institutions then were wise enough not to officially challenge “geographical
distribution” and “fair return,” realizing the importance of having ESA continue its central
role in enhancing Europe’s efforts and role in outer space. This included also prominently
the overarching need to allow European industry to compete on a global scale with the
giant industries of especially the United States, Russia, and China—which called for a huge
measure of concentration of European industrial efforts with reference to space rather than
the guarantee of competition within Europe, which might arguably weaken such global
competitiveness of the European industry.
It should once more be pointed out, that ESA is legally speaking an organization independent of the Union—it is not the EU’s space agency. Even the memberships do not completely align: eight EU member states are not members of ESA, vice versa two ESA member
states (Norway and Switzerland) are not members of the Union.
This also means that the twenty European states members of both organizations, in case
of an impossibility to comply with the EU legal regime and with the ESA legal regime at
the same time, would be stuck between a rock and a hard place—the EU institutions could
not simply overrule any relevant parts of the latter. While a deep politico-legal analysis
would likely come to the conclusion that such states would in the end have to ensure that
their obligations under the ESA Convention would be brought in line with those under the
EU treaties (rather than the other way round), and in the last resort perhaps would have
been forced to leave ESA,75 in reality those member states have shied away from providing
the EU institutions with the requisite political support to do so—meaning relevant legislative initiatives would never have passed the EU Council of Ministers.
When, in addition, the increased cooperation and coordination in matters of outer space
between the Union and ESA did not result in any subjugation of the former to the latter,76
it was clear which way wind was blowing here. Applying EU competition law even merely
in a formal sense (meaning, for the EU institutions to rubber stamp the ESA processes,
exercising a so far largely theoretical authority) for the time being would be a bridge too far.

8

VON DER

DUNK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 61ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

6. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, while the European Union following a long and winding road of policy and
legal initiatives can, at least since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, can
now assert competition jurisdiction in principle in all areas of space activity, and the European Commission could thus take the initiative to prepare for detailed EU-level legislation
in that respect, it so happened that a few major practical and political factors still stand in
the way of that actually happening as they still guide or even dictate any formation of EU
law through the EU machinery.
Other than for satellite communications, not accidentally the area of space activity
where ESA’s role ever since the early stage of experimental communication satellites is
negligible, the various sectors superficially being commercialized and privatized were, in
reality, far from mature enough to apply any Internal Market principles.
In launching and satellite remote sensing, at least until recently only one private operator was engaged in a full-fledged manner, whereas in satellite navigation the Union has so
far failed to find a private consortium sufficiently interested to buy a place in the drivers’
seat of Galileo and any possible plans to adopt a similar approach for Copernicus would
make little sense ever since.
ESA’s role itself further compounded the policy problems for the Union in pressing for
any application of the competition regime in the space sector, most tellingly in the manufacturing industry where at least several major consortia could be seen to operate—under
a regime which was anathema for any true believer in competition. As no subjugation of
ESA to the Union materialized, reflecting the wishes of ESA member states—which included the major EU member states as well—to keep ESA operating more or less as it used
to for decades, it became clear that there would be little or no political support for any
Commission legislative initiatives in this area.
And finally, also the Commission recognized that the overall interest in allowing the
European space industry to compete on a global scale outweighed any interest in creating
competition where the natural environment for competition would be largely lacking—as
duly reflected also in both ESA and EU rules allowing for exceptions to the suspiciousness,
respectively prohibition, of anticompetitive behavior.
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